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Evaluating the possible impact of pension reforms on 
elderly poverty in Europe 
 
Abstract 
Since the 1990s reforms have changed substantially both the nature of state pension 
provision and the level of generosity. This article tries to assess the impact of these 
changes using estimates of pension wealth for a number of hypothetical cases. By 
focusing on all prospective pension transfers rather than just those at the point of 
retirement, this approach can provide additional insights, especially on the impact of 
changes in benefit indexation.   
  These estimates corroborate existing evidence that reforms have decreased 
generosity significantly. Moves to link benefits to contributions have made systems less 
progressive, raising adequacy concerns for certain groups. The reforms have, in 
particular, strengthened the need of ensuring better access to labour markets, of having 
in place adequate crediting arrangements and minimum pensions.  
 
Keywords: Social Security; Public Pensions; Retirement; Poverty; Retirement Policies. 
 
This is an Author’s Original Manuscript of an article submitted for consideration in Social Policy & 
Administration [copyright Wiley]; Social Policy & Administration is available online at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9515 [DOI: 10.1111/spol.12084] 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent decades many European governments have radically changed their pension systems, 
carrying out significant reforms meant to ensure sustainability.
1
 As reducing the impact on 
future spending was frequently the main aim of these changes, it is not surprising that most 
early studies focused on this aspect.
2
 However, there is a growing body of evidence which 
suggests that these reforms may have adverse implications on future pension adequacy, 
particularly as they hit disproportionately entitlements of those groups less able to 
accommodate the effects of benefit cuts.
3
 While the standard measure of the fiscal success of 
a reform – reduced spending4 – is well-known, there is no similar consensus on how best to 
measure whether entitlements will remain adequate.
5
 The indicator typically used by 
international organisations – theoretical replacement rates - focuses specifically on generosity 
at the point of retirement. While some reforms have tended to result in lower initial benefits,
6
 
in many occasions a more substantial cut has occurred in later transfers, as reforms to 
indexation of pensions in payment have made pensions lose more of their relative value over 
time.
7
The impact of these changes is not gender-neutral as women live longer than men, and 
increases in line with longevity.   
This article, after reviewing some of the existing literature, will try to address this 
issue by presenting evidence on the impact of reforms on pension wealth – the value of all 
prospective pension transfers received during retirement – in ten European countries. In 
doing so, it will try to take into account of gender labour market and income differences, as 
the effect of reforms on full career entitlements tends to be weaker than the impact on those 
with incomplete careers and on low incomes.  
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1. A review of studies assessing the impact of reforms on pension adequacy 
 
European Commission (2006) notes that while declining pension generosity can contribute 
positively to fiscal sustainability, this decrease may raise concerns about the adequacy of 
public pensions that could translate into future pressures for higher public spending.
8
 This 
reflects the underlying thinking of the agreement reached in 2001 between EU Member 
States on common objectives on adequate and sustainable pensions. As part of the open 
method of co-ordination (OMC) - a voluntary process for political cooperation, progress is 
measured by monitoring agreed indicators. Member States prepare national reports, which are 
assessed by the Commission and Council and reflected in joint reports.
9
 In 2012 this 
culminated in the Commission preparing a white paper on pension reform.
10
 The main 
indicator through which pension adequacy is monitored is the change in the projected 
theoretical net replacement ratio over the next 40 years.
11
 The latter is defined as the level of 
pension income the first year after retirement as a percentage of individual earnings at the 
moment of take-up of pensions for an assumed hypothetical worker, who in the so-called 
„base case‟ has a given earnings and career profile (male earning average wage constant over 
his fulltime 40 years career, retiring at 65).
12
  
 
TABLE1  
 
Table 1 presents estimates for some selected countries and the EU average presented  
in the EU‟s 2012 pension adequacy report. These suggest that at present, on average across 
the EU the net replacement rate for the base case is 79%. While the Commission has never 
commented on adequate levels for replacement rates, the ILO and the World Bank suggest 
that the minimum threshold should be between 40% and 45%.
13
 Though by 2050, the EU 
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projections suggest a cut of slightly more than a seventh in the net replacement rate; this 
would remain well above these benchmarks. However as Blondell & Scarpetta (1999), one of 
the first studies of cross-country theoretical replacement rates, points out there is no such 
thing as a single replacement rate in any national pension scheme. This heterogeneity is quite 
evident from  table 1, which includes some other estimates prepared by the Commission on 
outcomes assuming different characteristics.  
Pension systems offer different outcomes depending on pre-retirement income and the 
contributory record. For instance, in the UK current replacement rates for those on high 
incomes are just above two-thirds those for someone on average income, while they are 
nearly equivalent in Italy. The generosity for those on low incomes tends to be higher than 
that for the average person – particularly in Eastern European countries at present. Yet this 
may be deceptive as these estimates assume a full career, which is highly unlikely for those 
on low incomes. A ten-year career break reduces the average net replacement rate for 
someone on average earnings by about a fifth across the EU. In some countries, like Slovakia, 
even a three year break to take care of children results in a significant loss.  The projections 
in table 1, moreover, suggest that career breaks will result in even higher penalties by 2050. 
Even if people were to retire later, on average, the net replacement rate would still be lower 
than it is at present.  
The literature studying the impact of pension reforms on adequacy appears to be 
divided into three main strands and tends to use replacement rates as the main indicator. The 
first strand attempts to evaluate the impact of changes in the pension system on a population 
with set characteristics, while the second focuses on the impact of the same pension rules but 
on different population groups. The third approach tries to look at the impact of different 
pension rules on different population groups. Within these categories, researchers have 
adopted three focuses, namely studying reforms in just one country, carrying out cross-
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country analysis and hypothetical reform simulations. Table 2 groups some existing studies 
along these dimensions.        
 
TABLE2 
 
The most common studies are those which evaluate the impact of different pension 
rules on a population assuming the same characteristics.  This is the approach taken by 
international institutions – e.g. OECD (2011), Martin & Whitehouse (2008), Holzmann & 
Guven (2009) and European Commission (2012c). It is also very common in single-country 
studies, for instance Orban & Palotai (2005) for Hungary and Coevering et al. (2006) for the 
UK. All of these studies develop estimates of the level of replacement rates for hypothetical 
individuals pre- and post-reform,
14
 and assume that the relative income and labour market 
behaviour of the individuals does not change over time. While these studies report significant 
declines in replacement rates, most shy away from trying to assess the possible implications 
of this trend. There are exceptions, such as Zaidi et al. (2006) which attempt to infer from the 
change in replacement rates the possible impact on poverty among the elderly, arguing that 
the anticipated decline in generosity will increase at-risk-of-poverty rates.  
This approach is however problematic as outcomes tend to differ greatly according to 
the characteristics of the underlying population, particularly gender.
15
 Fultz (2006) notes that 
these differences can mean similar reforms have different impacts on poverty. In this light, 
Fultz & Steinhilber (2003) find that reforms have tended to bring greater losses of pension 
protection for women compared to men. Sefton et al. (2011) also note the negative impact of 
weak labour market participation on the pension outcomes of women. Bottazzi et al. (2006) 
find that pension reforms in Italy hit disproportionately younger cohorts of workers.  Bridgen 
& Meyer (2008), looking at a group of „risk biographies‟ in the UK – such as people with 
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child care responsibilities, intermittent employment and self-employment – find that despite 
facing the same pension system these individuals face savings rates significantly above those 
currently paid by most employees in order to guarantee an adequate income during 
retirement. There have also been a number of interesting simulation exercises such as 
Atkinson et al. (2002) which argue that introducing a European Minimum Pension in the five 
biggest EU countries would, even if the pension were set at the same level in each country in 
terms of purchasing power parity, impact poverty differently. Similarly, Kotlikoff et al. 
(2006) find that the impact of the same policy – a 30% cut in US pension benefits – differs 
greatly looking at 14 stylized households, with those on low incomes facing the biggest fall in 
living standards.   
The final strand of pension reform evaluations attempts to evaluate how changes in 
both pension rules and the underlying population could affect poverty, income distribution 
and government spending. Fonseca & Sopraseuth (2006), Frommert & Heien (2006), Flood 
et al. (2008), Goodman et al. (2007) and Dekkers et al. (2009) suggest that reforms have led 
to a significant reduction in the redistributive effects of state pension systems and increased 
risks for those with interrupted careers and unskilled workers. All of this is happening in a 
context of a significant reduction in future generosity of state pensions for the average 
person. In fact, European Commission (2012), on the basis of official projections made by 
Member States, suggests that the average benefit ratio – the average pension to output per 
worker - is set to decline by a fifth by 2060.     
Soede et al. (2004), using a static model
16
 to study the distributive consequences of 
population ageing in six European countries up to 2025, find that while increasing labour 
participation helps improve the situation a policy focusing on financial sustainability is likely 
to lead to a substantial increase in poverty among the elderly. Ferraresi & Monticone (2009) 
adopting a similar approach but extending the analysis to another four countries and to cover 
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the period up to 2050 also find similar results, noting that contribution rates faced by future 
working age generations will have to rise substantially. Dusek & Kopecsni (2008), looking at 
the pension reforms undertaken since the 1990s in Hungary and Slovakia find that reforms 
affected different cohorts and education groups in quite peculiar ways. Reforms in Hungary 
favour future working age individuals, while those in Slovakia cut the entitlements of 
women, particularly those with low education, while raising the generosity of the system for 
young men with university education. 
   
2. Using pension wealth to measure impacts of pension reform    
 
The studies summarized above appear to be in broad agreement that pension reforms enacted 
since the 1990s in Europe have significantly reduced generosity, particularly for certain 
population groups, notably women. However for the most part, these studies focus on 
generosity at retirement, and fail to consider that reforms will also impact differently the 
relative value of pensions throughout retirement. In fact, the estimates presented in table 1 
suggest that while at present, on average, pension generosity for someone with a full career 
on the average wage declines by about one twelfth of its initial relative value after ten years, 
by 2050 the decline will increase to more than a tenth.  Only a handful of countries, amongst 
them Germany and the UK, have in place indexation rules that come close to maintaining the 
relative value of pensions unchanged.      
  In this light, here we focus on the impact of reforms on pension wealth.
17
 The latter is 
a measure of the lifetime value of state pension benefits; computed as the discounted stream 
of future pension payments during retirement weighted by the probability that the individual 
is still alive at a particular age.
18
 In simpler terms, this measure involves computing the 
annual pension benefits over the expected lifetime of the individual – taking into account the 
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way legislation specifies the annual benefit will be increased over time.
19
 This stream is then 
discounted so that these transfers can be expressed as a multiple of median disposable income 
at the time of retirement.
20
 OECD (2009) suggests that pension wealth can be thought as the 
lump sum that is needed to buy an annuity giving the same flow of pension payments over 
the expected retirement.      
 Consider the case of a country where pension benefits start high, but start declining 
thereafter. Looking at replacement rates, this country appears to have a generous system, but 
older pensioners would not be experiencing this. Pension wealth by looking at overall 
generosity accounts for this and so can be used to assess whether annual pension transfers 
remain enough that individuals, on average, have an annual income that keeps them out of 
relative poverty throughout retirement. Of course, the potential impact of this becomes even 
more important with higher longevity. Pension benefits which kept individuals above the 
poverty threshold close to retirement may stop to do so by the time the individual reaches 
very advanced ages. Countries which keep all parameters unchanged, but which modify the 
way the benefit changes post-retirement, are still reducing generosity even if it does not show 
up in their replacement rate projections. Returning to table 1, while at present, over the first 
decade in retirement the replacement rate for the base case in Sweden falls by just 1 
percentage point, in 2050 it will not only be lower at the start than it is today, but over time it 
will fall by 7 percentage points. On average, across the EU, the drop in replacement rates a 
decade into retirement will be larger than that in initial generosity.  
 There are two ways in which pension wealth is calculated – the empirical and the 
institutional approaches. The empirical method, which involves using data from income and 
wealth surveys, is retrospective in that it reflects current entitlements and past pension system 
rules.
21
 By contrast, the institutional approach calculates prospective pension entitlements by 
applying the pension system‟s parameters for a number of stylized individuals and then 
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grosses up results.
22
 This is the approach taken here to calculate pension wealth using the 
OECD‟s APEX cross-country pension entitlement model.23 APEX is a static simulation 
model which applies parameters of pre-reform and post-reform pension systems to 
hypothetical individuals whose characteristics are set by the researcher.  
The build-up of pension entitlements depends crucially on the institutional set-up of 
pensions in a country. For instance, in countries with notional defined contribution systems 
(such as Italy or Sweden), the accumulated pension wealth depends on the number of years 
during which contributions are made, the income on which contributions are paid and the 
notional return on contributions.
24
 This accumulated notional fund is then divided by 
expected life expectancy at retirement to calculate the initial benefit, which then is modified 
over time according to the post-retirement indexation regime. In countries with a defined 
benefit system (such as Austria and France) expected life expectancy does not play a direct 
role in determining the size of pension payments. The latter, instead, are a factor of qualifying 
earnings and the length of the qualifying period. Changes in longevity may however have an 
indirect effect, as they can lead to changes in the generosity of parameters. Moreover similar 
to what happens with defined contribution schemes, the rules determining how benefits are 
uprated over retirement determines the extent of pension wealth. Returning again to table 1, 
for those retiring in 2050 ten years after retirement the replacement rate will have fallen by 
eight percentage points both in France (a defined benefit system) and in Poland (a notional 
defined contribution system).        
The pension rules used for this article date to 2009, while the pre-reform pension 
systems are those of the early 1990s.
25
 We estimate pension wealth indicators for ten 
countries, namely Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, 
Sweden and the UK. These countries not only cover 70% of the EU‟s population, but also 
have very different pension systems and enacted very different reforms. For example, Italy, 
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Poland and Sweden moved from having a defined benefit system to having a national defined 
contribution system.
26
 By contrast, France and Germany retained their defined benefit system 
but introduced sustainability factors to limit the impact of ageing. The main features of these 
reforms are summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table3 
 
 For the purposes of this study we look at pension wealth arising just from state 
pensions (including minimum and basic pensions, and earnings-related publicly administered 
schemes, but not compulsory private schemes).
27
 We assume that there is full take-up of 
minimum pensions and that no private retirement saving is taking place – which raises some 
issues for countries with means-testing and significant private pension saving (e.g. the UK) as 
take-up of benefits and the level of savings may affect state entitlements. Another limitation 
of our analysis is that it does not take into account the impact of household formation, as we 
model individuals. This may affect outcomes in countries where state pension entitlements 
depend on the income of the individual‟s partner. However this issue is difficult to resolve 
unless one has access to a cross-country dynamic microsimulation model, and even then it 
would be very difficult to extricate the direct impact of reforms from all the underlying 
change.   
On the other hand, this study tries to adopt more realistic labour market assumptions 
when constructing hypothetical individuals. Official assessments (e.g. World Bank (2007), 
European Commission (2010), and OECD (2011)) focus on the pension entitlements of male 
average earners with a full labour market career. However this over-represents the poverty 
alleviation efficacy of pension systems, as it implies that all individuals benefit from the 
maximum possible generosity. As discussed previously, there is a growing body of evidence 
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which suggests that the impact of reforms may be stronger for those with incomplete careers, 
those on low incomes and women. In fact, most of the 1990s pension reforms sought to 
strengthen the link between contributory records and eventual pension entitlements, partly as 
policymakers wanted to introduce financial disincentives for early retirement. While data on 
contribution records are not readily available on a harmonized basis, available information 
(see European Commission (2012c)) suggests that  assuming the same labour participation 
across countries is unrealistic and also creates significant problems on a gender level within 
the same country.   
 
 
To remedy for data unavailability, we adopt an alternative measure of career length 
based on Labour Force Survey data on participation by age. Essentially we set the probability 
of the average person to be in employment at a particular age as equal to the activity rate at 
that age (e.g. if 33% of women aged 57 are engaged in labour market activity, we deem the 
probability of the average woman to be in employment at that age as 33%). These 
probabilities are then summed up to arrive at the number of full years between age 20 and 
pension age in which the individual is active. The advantage of this approach is that the 
Labour Force Survey is harmonized, and the European Commission prepares projections of 
activity rates by age. The latter (see European Commission (2012)) can be used to forecast 
how the length of contributory records might change (see table 4). While still subject to 
significant caveats,
28
 these estimates should be closer to actual career lengths than the full 
career assumption. The projections suggest that the average effective age of retirement for the 
overall population should rise in most countries. The increase among women reflects both a 
cohort effect – reflecting the catch-up in gender employment rates – and a policy effect – 
12 
 
gender pension age equalisation.  The change among men mostly reflects tightening of early 
retirement and disability schemes.  
 
TABLE4 
 
Career length is not the sole determinant of pension entitlements. The level of 
individual earnings also plays an important role. Rather than looking at just average earners, 
we look at hypothetical individuals for each gender working full-time but earning a wage 
equivalent to the lower deciles of the wage distribution in each country,
 29
 together with an 
individual on minimum pension provision. We focus on those earning less than the average 
wage, as these individuals are more likely to depend on state pensions. Looking at different 
cases is important as many pension systems are non-linear, exhibiting progressive features. 
We assume that our individuals, when employed, experience the average growth in wages, 
and remain always in the same relative position in the wage distribution over time – e.g. 
someone who starts a career on average earnings always is on the average earnings level 
prevalent in the year when employed. Average earnings are assumed to grow in each country 
by 2% in real terms, while inflation is assumed at 2.5%. Thus pension benefits would need to 
grow by 4.5% annually to retain their relative value vis-à-vis average earnings over time.                
    
3. The possible impact of pension reforms on poverty alleviation 
 
One of the failings of the OMC pension adequacy indicator is that the projected change in 
replacement rates is gender neutral despite the considerable disparity in gender elderly 
poverty rates across the EU (in 2011, 13% among men and 18% among women). Another 
issue is that there is little, if any, correlation between the OMC replacement rate estimates 
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and elderly poverty. For instance, Italian women are supposed to have a net replacement rate 
which is one and a half times that of German women, and yet the poverty rate among Italian 
women is a fifth higher. Replacement rates, as indicated by table 1, fall significantly with 
career breaks and moreover a high replacement rate on a low level of previous income will 
not necessarily imply high poverty alleviation. To understand better the capacity of pension 
benefits to reduce poverty, it makes sense to develop some form of benchmark linked to the 
poverty threshold. Note here that the underlying philosophy behind this benchmark is that 
underpinning the previously quoted ILO and World Bank quantitative replacement rate 
thresholds – i.e. the ability to guarantee a means to a decent standard of living after retirement 
and maintain subsistence levels of consumption. This is a restricted normative interpretation 
of pension adequacy, compared to the broader conceptions frequently found in the literature 
(e.g. Draxler & Mortensen (2009), Abatemarco (2009)).     
As explained previously, pension wealth defines the total pension transfers over a 
person‟s retirement as a multiple of the median disposable income. This sum can be 
compared to the sum required for individuals to have an income equivalent to median 
disposable income in each year of retirement. For example, if an individual at the point of 
retirement has pension wealth equivalent to 10 times median disposable income, and life 
expectancy is 20 years, then pension wealth on average enables the individual to have an 
income that is half the median disposable income.
30
 Since the poverty threshold adopted by 
the EU Commission is set at 60% of median disposable income, this would mean that our 
individual would not be out of poverty throughout retirement. In table 5  we present our 
estimates of the percentage of median disposable income that pension wealth can finance, on 
average, in retirement in 2005 and 2050 under the assumed actual career lengths and with full 
careers. 
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TABLE 5  
 
Our estimates, like many other studies, suggest that reforms have tended to reduce the 
strength of the poverty alleviation function of state pension systems. Though cuts have tended 
to be stronger for higher wages, and minimum pension provision has improved, men on lower 
incomes are now much less likely to have an income above the 60% relative poverty 
threshold, on average, throughout retirement. While entitlements are expected to rise, on the 
back of projected higher labour participation, state pension transfers will remain inadequate 
for most low-income women.  In particular, some reforms, mostly in Eastern Europe, raise 
issues about the future adequacy of pension systems for women and those on lower incomes 
as the degree of progressiveness has been reduced considerably. In these cases, unless women 
have access to other income sources, such as the pension entitlements of their partners, they 
face a seriously increased risk-of-poverty. While the generosity of minimum pensions 
appears to have either been safeguarded by pension reforms, or improved in some cases such 
as the UK, Germany and France, these transfers generally remain inadequate to maintain 
individuals out of poverty. At the point of retirement, minimum pensions in some countries, 
like Poland and France, are currently higher than the poverty threshold, but due to price 
indexation their value falls rapidly during retirement, especially for women who can retire at 
age 60 in both countries.   
 
The “actual careers” estimates confirm that the interaction between the labour market 
and the social protection system needs to be considered by researchers and policymakers 
alike. A system may look very generous on paper, but not be so in reality if only few 
individuals qualify for full benefits. This tends to be particularly pertinent for women. The 
“full-career estimates” of the strength of the poverty alleviation function are far higher than 
those resulting when adopting more realistic labour market assumptions. For instance, the 
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current pension wealth of those at the  bottom decile of the wage distribution in France allows 
them an average income in retirement equivalent to 51% of median disposable income, rather 
than the 63% if they had full-careers, while for women the drop is from 59% to 39%. Overall, 
“actual-careers” results are more in line with data on the actual risk-of-poverty and gender 
gaps in poverty risks. For example, under the “full-careers” assumption, Italian women are 
among the best provided for across Europe, failing to explain their high relative poverty rate. 
The “actual-careers” estimates appear to be much more representative of effective pension 
generosity.  
 
  
Reforms, generally speaking, reduce the strength of the poverty alleviation function 
and result in a greater degree of convergence across countries. Labour market trends can act 
as a countervailing force that offsets part of the effect of pension reforms. If participation 
rates rise as projected by the European Commission, effective generosity is set to improve in 
some countries, like France and Germany. However, in countries with the strongest cutbacks, 
such as Poland and Slovakia, not even the expected improvement in employment rates would 
sustain adequacy.   In these countries, the combination of the substantial reduction in 
progressiveness and the tightening of the link between contributions and eventual benefits 
have increased the importance of ensuring that those at the bottom of the wage distribution 
are able to have access to the labour market. Moreover, these reforms have increased the need 
for ensuring appropriate recognition for those who spend time out of the labour market to 
care for children or elderly dependents, as otherwise the new pension systems would 
reproduce their working-age income disadvantage. 
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The estimates presented here assume that all the hypothetical individuals show the 
same „average‟ labour market behaviour and will be able to lengthen their working lives to 
the extent expected by European Commission (2012). This is a strong assumption, 
particularly for individuals in the bottom deciles of the wage distribution, who typically have 
more interrupted careers. Another important consideration, given the fact that these estimates 
do not cover private schemes, is whether cuts in state pension generosity will be 
accommodated by higher private saving. While there has been a clear push from the part of 
European governments in this regard, in many countries the required boost in savings rates to 
remedy fully for the cuts in state generosity appears quite steep. Grech (2013) suggests that in 
Italy, Poland and Slovakia, low-income individuals would need to save some 13% of their 
income to maintain the same pension provision of the pre-reform systems.      
      
Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to complement the existing literature that tries to assess the impact of 
pension reforms on generosity, by using an indicator which as yet has not been put much to 
use – namely pension wealth. The benefit of this indicator is that it captures total pension 
transfers throughout retirement, rather than just those at the point of retirement. In this way it 
not only captures the impact of reforms on the initial value of pension benefits, but is able to 
capture the impact of changes in the period for which a benefit is received and also the fact 
that state pension benefits lose a significant part of their relative value over time due to 
indexation below wage growth. In order to verify whether pension reforms may have hit 
harder those on lower incomes and with incomplete careers, estimates of pension wealth were 
carried out for a range of hypothetical individuals with different income levels and with 
labour market behaviour more representative of actual and projected contributory records. 
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Our results confirm the finding that reforms carried out since the 1990s have reduced 
state pension generosity substantially unless careers lengthen considerably more than 
expected. They also suggest that focusing on pension entitlements for those with full careers 
can be misleading. For instance, in Slovakia the poverty threshold achievable by pension 
transfers to low-income individuals could nearly halve when considering more realistic career 
lengths. The “full-careers” assumption, by contrast, implies a drop of a fifth. The analysis in 
this article, therefore, suggests that pensioner poverty may re-emerge as an important issue in 
countries where at present its low level does not attract much political attention. Moreover 
moves to link benefits with contributions may have serious gender equality implications, 
which policymakers may not have fully considered and which may warrant improved 
minimum pension schemes and crediting arrangements.  That said, our estimates show that 
rising labour participation can help undo cuts in system generosity, and suggests the need for 
governments to ensure improved access to labour markets.   
 
References 
 
Abatemarco, A. (2009), Measurement issues for adequacy comparisons among pension 
systems, Report No.64, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Atkinson, A, Bourguignon, F., O‟Donoghue, C., Sutherland, H. and Utili, F. (2002), 
Microsimulation of social policy in the European Union: case study of a European Minimum 
Pension, Economica, 69: 229-243. 
 
Bardasi, E. and Jenkins, J. (2002), Income in later life: work history matters, York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
18 
 
Barr, N. (2000), Reforming pensions: myths, truths and policy choices, WP/00/139, 
Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Blondell, S. and Scarpetta, S. (1999), The retirement decision in OECD Countries, 
ECO/WKP(98)15, Paris: OECD. 
 
Bottazzi, R., Jappelli, T. and Padula, M. (2006), Retirement expectations, pension reforms, 
and their impact on private wealth accumulation, Journal of Public Economics, 90(12): 2187-
2212. 
 
Bridgen, P. and Meyer, T. (2008), Politically dominant but socially flawed: projected pension 
levels for citizens at risk in six European Multi-pillar pension systems. In M. Seeleib-Kaiser 
(ed.), Welfare State Transformations: Comparative Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 111-131. 
 
Brugiavini, A., Maser K. and Sunden, A. (2005), Measuring pension wealth, Paper given at 
Luxembourg Wealth Study, Luxembourg 25-29 January 2005.  
 
Disney, R. (2000), Crises in public pension programmes in OECD: what are the reform 
options?, The Economic Journal, 110(461): F1-F23. 
 
de Deken, J.J. (2002), Pensions and the reduction of non-wage labour costs: modelling a 
decade of reforms in Germany, Journal of European Social Policy, 12(4): 277-291. 
 
19 
 
Dekkers, G., Buslei, H., Cozzolino, M., Desmet, R., Geyer, J., Hofmann, D., Raitano, M., 
Steiner, V., Tanda, P., Tedeschi, S. and Verschueren, F. (2009), What are the consequences 
of the AWG-projections for the adequacy of social security pensions?, Report 65, Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Draxler, J. and Mortensen, J. (2009), Towards sustainable but still adequate pensions in the 
EU: theory, trends and simulations, Report No.67, Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies. 
 
Dusek, L. and Kopecsni, J. (2008), Policy risk in action: pension reforms and social security 
wealth in Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 
58(7): 329-358. 
 
Eckardt, M. (2005), The open method of coordination on pensions: an economic analysis of 
its effects on pension reforms, Journal of European Social Policy, 15(3): 247-267. 
 
European Commission (2006), The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU, 
European Economy 4/2006, Brussels: European Commission. 
 
European Commission (2010), Progress and key challenges in the delivery of adequate and 
sustainable pensions in Europe, European Economy 71/2010, Brussels: European 
Commission. 
 
European Commission (2012), The 2012 ageing report, European Economy 2/2012, 
Brussels: European Commission. 
20 
 
European Commission (2012b), An agenda for adequate, safe and sustainable pensions, 
COM(2012)55, Brussels: European Commission. 
 
European Commission (2012c), Pension adequacy in the European Union, Brussels: 
European Commission.  
 
Evans, M., Rake, K., and Falkingham, J. (2000), British Pension Policy in the Twenty-first 
Century: a Partnership in Pensions or a Marriage to the Means Test?, Social Policy and 
Administration 34(3): 296-317. 
 
Falkingham, J. and Johnson, P. (1995), Funding pensions over the life cycle”. In J. 
Falkingham and J. Hills (eds). The dynamic of welfare: the welfare state and the life cycle, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Feldstein, M. (1974), Social security, induced retirement and aggregate capital accumulation, 
The Journal of Political Economy, 82(5): 905-926. 
 
Ferraresi, P and Monticone, C. (2009), A semi-aggregate model for social expenditure 
projections, Report No.62. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Flood, L., Klevmarken, A. and Mitrut A. (2008), The income of the Swedish Baby Boomers. 
In A. Klevmarken and B. Lindgren (eds.), Simulating an Ageing Population: A 
microsimulation approach to Sweden, Bingley: Emerald Group. 
 
21 
 
Fonseca, R. and Sopraseuth, T. (2005), Welfare effects of Social Security reforms across 
Europe: the case of France and Italy, WP/138, Naples: Centre for Studies in Economics and 
Finance.  
 
Forster, M. and D‟Ercole, M.M. (2005), Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries 
in the second half of the 1990s,  DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2005)1, Paris: OECD. 
 
Frericks, P., Maier, R. and de Graaf, W. (2006), Shifting the pension mix: consequences for 
Dutch and Danish women, Social Policy and Administration, 40(5): 475-492. 
 
Frommert, D. and Heien, T. (2006), Retirement pension provision schemes in Germany 1996 
and 2005, Journal of Applied Social Science Studies, 126(2): 329-336. 
 
Fultz, E. and Steinhilber, S. (2003), The gender dimensions of social security reform in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In E. Fultz, M. Ruck and S. Steinhilber (eds). The 
Gender Dimensions of Social Security Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: Case Studies 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Budapest: International Labour Office.  
 
Fultz, E. (2006), Pension reform in the Baltic States, Budapest: International Labour 
OfficeLO. 
 
Ginn, J., Street, D. and Arber, S. (2001), Women‟s pension outlook: variations among liberal 
welfare states. In Ginn, Street and Arber (eds), Women, Work and Pensions, Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
 
22 
 
Goodman, A., Brewer, M., Emmerson, C., Muriel, A., Browne, J. and Tetlow, G. (2007), 
Pensioner poverty over the next decade: what role for tax and benefit reform, London: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Goodin, R., Headey, B., Muffels, R. and Dirven, H. (1999), The real worlds of welfare 
capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Grech, A. (2013), Assessing the sustainability of pension reforms in Europe, Journal of 
International and Comparative Social Policy, 29(2): 143-162. 
 
Holzmann, R. and Hinz, R. (2005), Old-age income support in the 21st century: an 
international perspective on pension systems and reform, Washington: World Bank. 
 
Holzmann, R. and Guven, U. (2009), Adequacy of retirement income after pension reforms in 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, Washington: World Bank. 
 
Howse, K. (2004), What has fairness got to do with it? Social justice and pension reform, 
Ageing Horizons, 1: 3-16.  
 
Humblet, M. and Silva, R. (2002), Standards for the XXIst century: Social Security, Geneva: 
International Labour Office. 
 
Kotlikoff, L.J., Marx, B. and Rizza, P. (2006), Americans’ dependency on Social Security, 
MRRC/WP/2006-126, Michigan: University of Michigan. 
23 
 
Martin, J. P. and Whitehouse, E. (2008), Reforming retirement-income systems: lessons from 
the recent experiences of OECD countries, DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM (2008)3, Paris: OECD. 
 
Meyer, T. and Pfau-Effinger, B. (2006), Gender Arrangements and Pension Systems in 
Britain and Germany: tracing change over five decades, International Journal of Ageing and 
Later Life, 1(2): 67-100. 
 
Muller, K. (2002), Beyond privatisation: pension reform in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 12(4): 293-306. 
 
OECD (2007), Pensions at a glance 2007, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2011), Pensions at a glance 2011, Paris: OECD. 
 
Orban, G. and Palotai, D. (2005), The sustainability of the Hungarian pension system: A 
reassessment, MNB/OP/40, Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
 
Orszag, P. and Stiglitz, J. (1999), Rethinking pension reform: ten myths about Social Security 
systems, Washington: World Bank. 
 
Sefton, T., Evandrou, M., Falkingham, J., and Vlachantoni, A. (2011), The relationship 
between women‟s work histories and incomes in later life in the UK, US and West Germany, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 21(1): 20-36. 
  
24 
 
Soede, A.J., Vrooman, C., Ferraresi, P.M. and Segre, G. (2004), Unequal welfare states: 
distributive consequences of population ageing in six European countries. The Hague: Social 
and Cultural Planning Office. 
 
Schneider, O. (2009), Reforming pensions in Europe: economic fundamentals and political 
factors, Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59(4): 292-308. 
 
Sutherland, H., Hancock, R., Hills, J. and Zantomio, F. (2009), Failing to keep up? The long-
term effects of current benefit and tax uprating policies, Benefits, 17(1): 47-56. 
 
Van de Coevering, C., Foster, D., Haunit, P., Kennedy, C., Meagher, S. and van den Berg, J. 
(2006), Estimating economic and social welfare impacts of pension reform,  London: 
Department for Work and Pensions. 
 
Whitehouse, E. (2003), The value of pension entitlements: a model of nine OECD countries, 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2003)9, Paris: OECD. 
 
World Bank (2007), Pensions panorama, Washington: World Bank.   
 
Zaidi, A., Makovec, M., Fuchs, M., Lipszyc, B., Lelkes, O., Rummel, M., Marin, B. and de 
Vos, K. (2006), Poverty of elderly people in EU25: First report, Vienna: European Centre for 
Social Welfare Policy and Research. 
 
Zaidi, A. and Grech, A (2007), Pension policy in EU25 and its impact on pension benefits, 
Benefits, 15(3): 229-311. 
25 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: OMC theoretical net replacement rates in 2010 and 2050 in square brackets (%) – 
selected countries 
 Base case  Base Case 
10 years in 
retirement 
3 years 
childcare 
break 
10 years 
career 
break 
Retire 
later  
High 
income 
Low 
income 
Austria 85[89] 75[80] 83[88] 70[71] 88[98] 77[72] 84[84] 
Finland 69[62] 60[55] 65[61] 54[51] 75[69] 63[52] 72[63] 
France 78[59] 65[51] 76[61] 57[42] 81[65] 63[48] 79[59] 
Germany 59[64] 59[61] 62[73] 44[48] 70[71] 51[50] 54[60] 
Hungary 100[75] 107[59] 66[71] 48[55] 112[87] 88[56] 83[75] 
Italy 90[69] 84[61] 86[76] 71[55] 89[76] 87[56] 90[71] 
Poland 76[43] 58[35] 68[32] 63[34] 78[49] 61[32] 87[48] 
Slovakia 75[65] 70[54] 52[54] 56[48] 86[73] 56[51] 78[65] 
Sweden 60[53] 59[46] 60[52] 58[41] 66[63] 58[48] 83[53] 
UK 77[75] 72[69] 77[77] 63[64] 80[78] 54[50] 87[90] 
EU 79[67] 72[60] 75[69]  62[46] 84[74] 67[51] 81[70] 
Note: Replacement rates are worked out net of income taxes and employee contributions basis, but 
include employer contributions. They represent the situation of people retiring under the legislation 
enacted by 2010. They also include income from private pensions if coverage is significant. The EU 
estimate is calculated as a weighted average by country population for all EU countries. 
Source: European Commission (2012c). 
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Table 2: A taxonomy of studies on reforms’ effects on pension adequacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Same system, different 
populations 
Cross country studies 
Atkinson et al. (2002) 
Fultz (2006) 
Sefton et al. (2011) 
Country-specific studies 
Bottazzi et al. (2006) 
Bridgen & Meyer (2008) 
Fultz & Steinhilber (2003) 
Simulation studies 
Kotlikoff et al. (2006) 
 
 
Same population, different 
systems 
Cross country studies 
European Commission (2012) 
Holzmann & Guven (2009) 
Martin & Whitehouse (2008) 
OECD (2011) 
Zaidi et al. (2006) 
Country-specific studies 
Orban & Palotai (2005) 
Van de Coevering et al. (2006) 
Simulation studies 
Falkingham & Johnson (1995) 
 
 
Different systems, different 
populations 
Cross country studies 
Dusek & Kopecsni (2008) 
Dekkers et al. (2009) 
European Commission (2012) 
Ferraresi & Monticone (2009) 
Soede et al. (2004) 
Country-specific studies 
Fonseca & Sopraseuth (2006) 
Flood et al. (2008) 
Frommert & Heien (2006) 
Goodman et al. (2007) 
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Table 3: Reforms to pension systems between 1990 and 2009, selected countries 
Country Pension eligibility age Adjusted retirement 
incentives 
Change in benefit formula 
or qualifying conditions 
Link to life expectancy 
and/or financial 
sustainability 
Defined contribution (DC) 
scheme 
Indexation  
Austria Gender pension age 
equalised.  
Benefit reduction for early 
retirement introduced.   
Best 15 years to 40 years. 
Reduction in accrual rate. 
Introduction of 
sustainability factor 
 Less generous indexation 
for higher pensions.  
Finland  Increased accrual rate for 
working  after 63.  
10 last years to lifetime 
average. Basic pension 
income-tested. 
Life expectancy multiplier.  Less generous valorisation  
and indexation.  
France  Changes in adjustment to 
benefits for early/late 
retirement.  
Minimum contribution 
period increased.  Earnings 
measure from best 10 to 
best 25 years. Targeted 
minimum income of 85% of 
minimum wage. 
Minimum contribution 
period to increase further 
with changes in life 
expectancy. 
 Valorisation now effectively 
to prices in all schemes.  
Germany To increase to 67. Benefit reduction for early 
retirement.  
 Valorisation and indexation 
cut back as system 
dependency ratio worsens. 
Voluntary DC pensions with 
tax privileges.  
  
Hungary Increase in age from 55 
(women) and 60 ( men) to 
62. 
Accrual rates linear rather 
than higher for earlier 
years.  
Minimum pension to be 
abolished. 
Through annuity calculation 
in DC scheme. 
DC scheme: mandatory for 
new entrants, voluntary for 
existing workers.  
Indexation down to 50% 
wage growth.  
Italy Normal pension age 
increased by 5 years.  
Adjustment to early-
retirement benefits through 
notional annuity calculation.  
 
From Defined Benefit (DB) 
to notional accounts.  
Through notional annuity 
calculation  
 Less generous indexation 
of higher pensions.  
Poland Withdrawal of early 
retirement for certain 
groups.  
 Abolition of basic pension.  
From DB to notional 
accounts.  From best 
consecutive 10 in final 20 
to lifetime average.  
Through notional annuity 
calculation in public 
scheme and annuity 
calculation in DC.  
DC scheme mandatory for 
new entrants and workers 
under 30. 
  
Slovakia Increase to 62.   From DB to points system. 
From best 5 in final 10 to 
lifetime average earnings.  
 DC scheme mandatory for 
new entrants and voluntary 
for existing workers.  
Indexation down to 50% 
wage growth. 
Sweden   From DB to notional 
accounts. Best 15 years to 
lifetime average. 
Through calculation of 
notional  and DC annuity. 
Additional sustainability 
adjustment in notional 
accounts.  
DC scheme mandatory for 
nearly all workers.  
 Wage indexation 
decreased by 1.6 
percentage points. 
UK Women’s pension age and 
eligibility for minimum 
pension from 60 to 65. 
Pension age to rise to 68. 
Increment for deferring 
pensions increased.  
Qualifying years for basic 
pension lowered. Increase 
in basic pension. Increased 
progressivity of earnings-
related pension. 
 Employers required to 
provide access to 
DCpension.  
 Basic pension and 
minimum pension wage 
indexed. 
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Table 4: Assumed contribution years of those retiring in 2005 and 2050 in square brackets 
 Male Female 
Austria 35[36] 29[35] 
Finland 36[39] 34[38] 
France 35[35] 30[33] 
Germany 37[41] 31[41] 
Hungary 31[32] 23[29] 
Italy 35[37] 23[28] 
Poland 33[35] 27[28] 
Slovakia 36[35] 30[31] 
Sweden 38[42] 36[39] 
UK 38[41] 30[37] 
Source: Own estimates based on 2005 labour participation data from Eurostat‟s Labour Force 
Survey and European Commission (2012) projections.     
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Table 5: The percentage of median disposable income that pension wealth can finance, on average, in retirement in 2005 and 2050 under the assumed actual career lengths and full careers in 
square brackets (%) 
Men 
 
Bottom decile Second decile Third decile Fourth decile Minimum pension 
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 82[83] 63[74] 92[93] 70[83] 99[101] 75[89] 105[108] 80[94] 
42 41 
Finland 58[71] 59[65] 62[76] 62[70] 66[82] 66[74] 69[87] 70[80] 
37 36 
France 51[63] 61[62] 58[69] 61[62] 64[76] 61[63] 70[83] 62[69] 
43 45 
Germany 47[52] 49[50] 55[66] 57[57] 63[75] 62[63] 69[83] 63[68] 
43 49 
Hungary 55[64] 51[66] 60[70] 56[72] 72[83] 67[86] 86[99] 80[103] 
30 36 
Italy 85[87] 56[69] 90[96] 60[76] 97[103] 68[81] 105[110] 78[87] 
36 36 
Poland 52[63] 37[38] 59[73] 45[50] 68[83] 54[59] 73[90] 62[68] 
47 37 
Slovakia 74[81] 46[61] 89[97] 47[73] 100[109] 53[82] 110[120] 59[91] 
49 46 
Sweden 63[63] 56[57] 66[70] 61[63] 70[75] 64[66] 74[80] 67[69] 
37 35 
UK 41[42] 57[59] 43[46] 58[60] 46[50] 59[61] 49[53] 60[63] 
41 52 
Average 56[62] 53[57] 62[71] 57[63] 69[78] 62[67] 74[85] 66[73] 41 44 
Women 
 
Bottom decile Second decile Third decile Fourth decile Minimum pension 
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 48[60] 48[61] 53[67] 50[68] 67[72] 56[72] 72[78] 62[79] 
42 41 
Finland 53[64] 55[61] 55[68] 57[63] 56[72] 57[65] 57[75] 60[69] 
37 36 
France 39[59] 60[60] 40[64] 60[60] 40[70] 61[61] 41[74] 62[62] 
43 45 
Germany 44[46] 49[50] 47[48] 50[50] 47[60] 52[52] 47[67] 55[58] 
43 49 
Hungary 59[63] 48[68] 60[67] 52[73] 67[76] 56[82] 76[87] 66[93] 
30 36 
Italy 57[71] 41[64] 62[77] 46[69] 65[82] 47[73] 69[87] 50[78] 
36 36 
Poland 52[66] 37[37] 48[62] 37[37] 54[70] 34[38] 58[76] 35[44] 
47 37 
Slovakia 59[66] 41[50] 70[79] 41[60] 78[87] 41[66] 85[96] 41[72] 
49 46 
Sweden 46[49] 44[44] 51[58] 50[54] 55[65] 54[58] 61[69] 56[62] 
37 35 
UK 41[41] 56[60] 41[41] 56[60] 41[41] 56[60] 41[44] 57[61] 
41 52 
Average 47[55] 49[55] 48[58] 51[57] 50[65] 52[59] 52[70] 54[63] 41 44 
Note: These indicators calculate the percentage of median disposable income that pension wealth at point of retirement would be able to finance on average throughout retirement. For those on 
minimum provision there is no difference between entitlements assuming actual and full careers.   
Source: Own estimates using APEX. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                               
1
 For an overview of these reforms, see European Commission (2010), OECD (2007) and 
Zaidi & Grech (2007). 
2
 E.g. Disney (2000). 
3
 The  1990s policy shift has been criticized by many (see Barr (2000), de Deken (2002), 
Muller (2002), and Orzsag & Stiglitz (1999)). Empirical evidence backs up these criticisms. 
For instance, Forster & Mira D‟Ercole (2005) conclude that changes in the generosity of 
public transfers played the largest role in shaping changes in poverty risks among the elderly 
within OECD countries during the second half of the 1990s.    
4
 A standard example is Schneider (2009), where the author argues that the margin of success 
of a reform depends on the size of the decline  l in expected spending on public pensions by 
2050.. 
5
 This lack of consensus can have repercussions. Eckardt (2005) argues that as long as no 
reliable indicators exist, which allow one to evaluate the effect ofstructural changes on future 
welfare, the policy-making process will continue to focus on cutting spending.   
6
 This is particularly true for systemic pension reforms, such as those in Sweden and Poland – 
which result in annual pension benefits being linked directly to contributions and changing 
automatically with demographic developments. 
7
 Benefit indexation rules determine how the value of a benefit changes after it is awarded. 
For instance, a benefit could be increased in line with inflation over time. Sutherland et al. 
(2009) shows the potential impact of uprating on benefit generosity in the context of the UK 
benefit system. 
8
 Similar arguments have been made. For instance, Howse (2004) argues that even if one 
agrees with the notion that pension spending is approaching the limits of political 
acceptability and economic efficiency, this does not mean that the policy task is simply that 
of ensuring that these limits are not transgressed.  
9
 E.g. European Commission (2010). 
10
 European Commission (2012b). 
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11
 See European Commission (2012c). 
12
 European Commission (2010). 
13
 See Holzmann & Hinz (2005) and Humblet & Silva (2002). 
14
 Another approach (see for instance Goodin et al. (1999)) is to compute replacement rates 
using income survey data. However, this gives only retrospective rates and assumptions on 
labour  participation and the impact of new pension rules would be needed to carry out 
assessments of recent reforms.  
15
 The substantial gender and income pension inequality is well-covered in the literature (e.g. 
Bardasi & Jenkins (2002), Evans et al. (2000), Falkingham & Rake (2001), Frericks et al. 
(2006), Ginn & Arber (2001), and Meyer & Pfau-Effinger (2006)).  
16
 As Soede et al. (2004) point out, there are two possible approaches for exploring future 
poverty risks. The first, dynamic microsimulation involves a year-to-year estimation of 
income for each person in a survey based on their projected characteristics and tax/benefit 
systems. The second, static microsimulation implies the transformation of incomes according 
to projected average future income developments, diversified for each socio-economic group, 
with the sizes of the groups adjusted by reweighting in line with demographic projections.   
17
 The concept of pension wealth was introduced in applied policy studies in Feldstein 
(1974). 
18
 Eurostat‟s mortality tables are used for each country.  
19
 Mathematically the estimation of pension wealth involves multiplying the initial pension 
benefit by an annuity factor. The latter is meant to capture the number of years the benefit 
will be received and also the relative reduction (if any) of the benefit in relation to average 
earnings. For example, if the initial benefit is worth 30% of average earnings, is uprated in 
line with average earnings and the benefit is received for 20 years, then pension wealth at 
retirement would be equivalent to 6 times average earnings. If however the benefit loses 
value over time, then the initial 30% is not multiplied by 20, but rather by a factor that 
captures this loss. 
20
 A discount rate of 2% has been used here. Using a higher rate would reduce the net present 
value of pension transfers paid towards the end of an individual‟s life.  
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21
 For a thorough discussion see Brugiavini et al. (2005). There are variants of this approach 
which try to incorporate future entitlements by projecting the impact of future rules. 
22
 See Whitehouse (2003). 
23
 The APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across countries) model codes detailed 
eligibility and benefit rules for mandatory pension schemes based on available public 
information that has been verified by country contacts. It is used in the OECD‟s biennial 
„Pensions at a Glance‟ publication, in the World Bank‟s „Pensions Panorama‟ and in 
European Commission reports..  
24
 In the case of Sweden this is equal to wage growth, while in Italy it is GDP growth. 
25
 The reforms do not consider pension reforms effected after 2009. These changes, such as 
those carried out in Hungary in the wake of the financial crisis, could result in much lower 
generosity than envisaged here.  
26
 In a defined benefit system, pension benefits are determined as a ratio of a set salary – the 
final salary, the average lifetime salary or an intermediate figure - on which contributions 
were paid. Under a (notional) defined contribution system, pension entitlements depend on 
accumulated contributions (and credits) and on the (notional) interest accorded them. This 
accumulated sum is divided by the expected lifetime at retirement to calculate an annuity. 
27
 See European Commission (2010) for details of the pension systems modelled in APEX. 
The absence of estimates for projected returns from compulsory private schemes can be seen 
as a defect of this study. However the policy reversals seen recently in many Eastern 
European countries which are undoing these schemes, suggests that even policymakers are 
unsure of their eventual return. 
28
 We are imposing the average labour participation of a cross-section of generations on a 
single generation. Moreover we are assuming that all our individuals display average labour 
participation trends over their career. These might instead differ across the wage distribution. 
29
 These wage data are from Eurostat‟s Structure of Earnings Survey and cover workers in the 
private sector excluding farming and fishing. 
30
 Note that this approach assumes that an individual is able to transfer pension wealth 
equally throughout retirement. 
